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Several prominent academic critics of regulation, most notably Cass Sunstein and Stephen
Breyer, claim that our regulatory system does not establish sensible priorities.1 Their reform
recommendations seek to correct this problem - to get our priorities straight.
What precisely does it mean to say that we do not have our priorities straight? This article
develops a theoretical framework to address this question.
This strand of the regulatory reform debate matters a lot. Congressional and academic
proponents of regulatory reform have relied heavily upon claims that the regulatory system fails to
establish sensible priorities to justify more reliance upon cost-benefit considerations in agency decisionmaking.2 The goal of improving priority setting sounds much more attractive than the goal many
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TOWARD EFFECTIVE
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See e.g. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 86-89; 145
CONG. REC. S3483 (daily ed. March 25, 1999) (statement of Senator
Thompson)(Senator and several Governors linking regulatory
reform legislation including cost-benefit analysis to better
priority setting); 144 CONG. REC. E2142 (daily ed. October 13,
1998)(statement of Representative Bliley)(stating that Congress
needs information about costs and benefits of regulatory
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knowledgeable scholars link to cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the reduction of the stringency and scope
of laws protecting public health and the environment.3 So reliance upon priority setting talk helps CBA
politically, giving it a neutral aura. After more than two decades of writing legislation that made
protection of public health the primary goal of much of the regulatory system,4 the 104th Congress

1996)(statement of Senator Smith)(we must incorporate costbenefit analysis in our environmental regulations in order to
“prioritize our goals.”); 141 CONG. REC. S17744 (daily ed.
November 29, 1995)(statement of Senator Bond)(stressing CBA as
it relates to budget priorities because “that is the only way .
. . to get the biggest bang for the buck”); 141 CONG. REC. H12007
(daily ed. November 9, 1995)(statement of Representative
Clinger)(stating that cost-benefit provisions in regulatory
reform legislation requires the prioritization needed because of
limited federal resources).
See e.g. McGarity, supra note 1, at 11 (cost-benefit
analysis “will invariably reduce the protections that the
existing statutes currently afford to citizens and the
environment.”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld,
75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 541-549 (1997) (explaining how a cost-benefit
requirement and hard look judicial review ended regulation under
section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act).
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See e.g. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. EPA,
824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(in banc)(interpreting requirement
that EPA regulate toxic air pollutants to provide an ample
margin of safety to public health); Lead Industries Ass'n v.
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980)(forbidding consideration of cost in establishing national
ambient air quality standards to protect public health); Public
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (primary
goal of Food Drug and Cosmetic Act is "human safety"); American
Textile Manuf. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981)
(goal of statute is to advance worker health, unless doing so is
unfeasible; CBA rejected). Cf. Corrosion Pipe Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991)(applying a cost-benefit test to
regulation of the manufacturing of toxic substances); Union
Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976) (States may consider
costs in choosing strategies for meeting national ambient air
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passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,5 which requires CBA of major rules.6 Since
then, Congress has regularly considered, and come close to passing, regulatory reform legislation that
requires agencies to justify substantially all major regulation in cost-benefit terms.7 This involves a
major change in the goals of statutes that have hitherto sought to protect public health and the
environment.8 In general, industry has enthusiastically supported CBA and environmentalists and

quality standards).
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Pub. L. No. 104-4; 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C.). See generally Rena Steinzor, Unfunded
Environmental Mandates and the "New Federalism":
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Revolution or Reform, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97 (1996).
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Id. § 202, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532.
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RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (NRDC), BREACH OF FAITH: HOW THE CONTRACT ’ S FINE
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Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405
(1996); Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 272-286; NRDC, AT THE
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ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS AND O PPORTUNITIES IN THE 106 TH C ONGRESS
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ENVIRONMENT (1996).
7
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consumer advocates have opposed it.9 Academics and policy-makers who support CBA as a means
of improving priority setting have never explained why CBA influences priority setting, let alone
improves it. A coherent theory of priority setting helps clarify the precise meaning of priority setting
claims. This clarification aids evaluation of claims that regulatory priorities are seriously askew and that
CBA helps cure priority setting defects.
This article claims that regulatory reformers infer priority defects from evidence of allocative
inefficiency. This helps explain (but not justify) some reformers' endorsement of CBA as a priority
setting mechanism. Regulatory reformers’ use of improved priority setting as a metaphor for improved
allocative efficiency obscures the issues at stake in the regulatory reform debate. Priority setting talk
allows scholars and legislators to advocate a reform that addresses the stringency of regulation, while
giving the impression that something as innocuous as an ordering of tasks is at stake.

ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 554-558, 560-563 (1997)(explaining how a costbenefit criterion would change existing environmental law);
Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the
Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1996)(describing
regulatory reform as involving “radical changes” to regulatory
statutes); Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 253-257
(suggesting
that
regulatory
reform
might
constitute
a
“constitutional moment” if it went far enough).
See Gregory S. Wetstone, And Now, Regulatory Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at A23 (characterizing House regulatory
reform as “a recipe for gridlock.”); Regulatory Reform:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th
Cong. 122 (1995)(statement of Linda Greer, Ph.D., Senior
Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council)(explaining that
“those with the most money to develop information” can use risk
assessment to slow down the regulatory system); McGarity, supra
note 1, at 34.
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This article first develops a theoretical framework describing priority setting. The second part
maps out the law of priority setting, emphasizing examples from the law of pollution control. Amazingly,
regulatory reform advocates have made their recommendations for improving priority setting in a legal
vacuum, with no discussion of the priority setting mechanisms that now exist. The third part examines
Breyer and Sunstein’s claim that regulatory priorities are seriously askew. The fourth part critiques the
claim that CBA will improve priority setting.
Clarity about the concept of priority setting yields conclusions with important implications for
the regulatory reform debate. We do not yet know whether we have a serious priority setting problem.
If we have a problem, cost-benefit analysis of standard setting does nothing to address it.
I. Priority Setting: A Conceptual Framework
The word “priority” comes from the Latin word “prior.”10 “Prior” refers to the earlier or first of
several items, although it has also referred to the most important of a number of things.11
Strictly speaking, priority setting involves establishing an ordering of some kind. Ordering
implies that we plan to complete several tasks, but we lack the resources to tackle them all at once, so
we accomplish them in rank order.
We commonly use the term priority setting a little less strictly to refer to decisions about
performing some tasks while leaving others undone. This mode of priority setting, selection, involves a
value judgment, in the context of limited resources, that some tasks are not worth doing.
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We also make decisions to devote more of our time (or some other resource, like money) to
one set of tasks rather than another. Some allocative decisions might function as secondary priority
setting decisions. We may unintentionally affect selection or ordering of tasks by decisions about
resource allocation. Hence, for example, we may counsel a young father to spend less money on
restaurant meals, because we fear that he will not save enough money to pay for his children’s
education. We may fear that a resource allocation decision may result in unintentional selection, a tacit
decision not to educate his child after high school. I will refer to allocation decisions that affect ordering
or selection as allocative priority setting.
Some allocation decisions, however, have little impact upon ordering or selection. We may
have decided that one task is more important than another. We conclude from this that we must do a
better job at a high priority task than at a low priority task. We therefore allocate more resources to
the high priority task. We might refer to this as a "performance allocation," since this type of allocation
involves a decision to perform some tasks better than others. Perfectionists reject performance
allocation altogether.
We might allocate more time to some tasks, however, precisely because we intend to perform
all tasks equally well. Some tasks require more resources than others, because of the nature of the
task. Hence, a lawyer may devote more time to an anti-trust case than a simple divorce, because a
competent trial of an anti-trust issue may simply require more preparation than a competent trial of a
divorce issue. We might refer to this as "difficulty allocation," trying to match resources to the difficulty
of the task at hand. A difficulty allocation assumes an equal commitment to a set of tasks. This equal
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commitment bespeaks a decision not to set priorities among the tasks at hand. This means that some
resource allocation decisions involve priority setting and others do not.
We sometimes fail to carry out all of our tasks perfectly in spite of good priority setting. This
means that one cannot judge somebody else's priorities by looking at the results they produce alone. A
person may fail to complete a task, for example, because she could not accomplish it, not because she
assigned it a low priority. So, for example, a law student may fail a class, not because she failed to
devote sufficient time to her studies, but because she could not understand the material. We cannot
infer anything about ordering, selection, or allocation of resources directly from results. We must
examine priority setting and allocation directly.
Regulatory reformers focus upon regulatory priority setting.12 Hence, a conceptual framework
must address the priorities of organizations, not just individuals. The basic concepts of ordering,
selection, and allocation will still prove useful, but the more complex context demands some
elaboration.
Because administrative agencies consist of people who devote time to tasks, analysis of agency
priority setting might be directly analogous to individual priority setting decisions-decisions about how to
spend our time. Agency decisions, however, often have broad ramifications.
The product of agency decision-making, a legally binding decision, often requires regulated
firms to spend their money.13 This means that agency decisions usually affect allocation decisions at
regulated firms. So, a clear regulatory reform debate must specify whose resources are at stake.
12

See e.g. Breyer, supra note 1, at 19.
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See e.g. id. at 12.
7

Regulatory reformers often lament the “misallocation” of “social resources.”14 This reference to “social
resources” contains an important ambiguity. It does not specify whose resources have been
misallocated, the government’s or those of the private firms it regulates.15 And it does not explain
clearly whose priorities must be set straight.
Administrative agencies do not have complete control of their activities. Administrative
agencies carry out mandates in legislation that Congress passes with funds that Congress appropriates.
This means that analysts must distinguish between administrative and Congressional priority setting.16
Agencies, like individuals, often fail to carry out their tasks well because of external pressures.17
For this reason, we can not tell much about priority setting from agency performance without some
direct analysis of agency priory setting. For example, if an agency decides to regulate a very harmful

See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 52 (discussing goal of
ensuring that “social resources are devoted to the most serious
problems.”).
14

See e.g. Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle be Unbroken?:
A Review of the Hon. Stephen Breyer’s Breaking the Vicious
Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 24 ENVT’L. L. 1707,
1716 (1994) (Breyer fails to consider the distinction between
government and private party costs).
15

See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning Regulatory
Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (1985)(regulatory reformers
should distinguish between claims that Congressional goals are
wrong with claims that its goals can be achieved more cost
effectively)
16

See id. at 1292-1293; Thomas O. McGarity, Not So
Paradoxical:
The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation,
1991 Duke L. J. 729, 736-739.
17
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substance in gasoline, but a court enjoins it from doing so, we would be wrong to infer that the agency
chose its priorities poorly by not regulating the harmful substance.18
As we go about our daily lives, we may not think about priorities in such explicit terms. But if
we want to counsel an individual on how to get his priorities straight, we might do well to bear these
different types of priority setting in mind, even if these modes of priority setting overlap. Scholars
should be no less precise as they provide advice about reforming institutions addressing important social
problems.
Clearly, priority setting can have many meanings. And the distinctions between various kinds of
priority setting have important implications.
II. The Law of Priority Setting
This section maps out the legal landscape of priority setting. This discussion uses the law of
pollution control to illustrate the concepts of ordering, selection, and allocation, rather than provide
comprehensive coverage of all of the law of priority setting.
A. Ordering
Many pollution control problems stem from a large variety of pollution sources.19 Resource
limitations generally preclude regulating every important pollution source at once.
Congress often sets (or authorizes agencies to set) early deadlines for large pollution sources
and later deadlines (or no deadlines) for relatively small sources of a group of pollutants targeted for

See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3rd 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(striking down an EPA ban on manganese in gasoline).
18

19

See Driesen, supra note 8, at 582.
9

regulation.20 Thus, for example, section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to establish
regulations for major sources of hazardous air pollutants, but requires regulation of smaller "area
sources" according to a later schedule.21 Congress imposed deadlines upon state regulation of major
sources of conventional air pollutants in areas with dirty air, while leaving regulation of smaller sources
subject to no specific deadline.22 Similarly, Congress required technology-based standards for point
sources of water pollution, often large manufacturing facilities, while leaving regulation of non-point
sources (such as farms) to subsequent state action. 23
In establishing priorities among clean-up tasks involving mixes of pollutants Congress often
orders regulation by risk, rather than size. For example, the Comprehensive Environmental
Responsibility and Cleanup Act (CERCLA)24 requires EPA to establish a national priorities list of
"superfund sites" (sites where hazardous waste has been dumped) based on the relative risks the sites

See e.g. National Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3rd 1351,
1353-1354 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(discussing the CAA’s differential
treatment of major and “area” pollution sources).
20

21

See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1),(3);(e)(1).

22

See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A),(2)(C);(c),(d),(e).

See 33 U.S.C. § 1311; Oliver A. Houck, Are We There Yet?:
The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the
Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10391 (Aug. 1997).
23

24

42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
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pose to public health and the environment.25 CERCLA generally anticipates earlier clean-up of high
priority sites.26
Sometimes Congress combines size and toxicity to order a set of tasks. For example, section
112 of the CAA authorizes EPA to consider both toxicity, quantity, and location in establishing a
schedule for regulation of major sources of hazardous air pollution.27 Similarly, legislation banning
disposal of waste on land under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires EPA
to implement the ban in phases.28 RCRA instructs EPA to consider both “high volume” and intrinsic
hazard” in establishing a schedule.29
Congress, however, recognized that rank ordering priorities under RCRA and the CAA could
involve EPA in litigation before any clean-up occurred and exempted EPA’s scheduling decisions
regarding the land ban and regulation of major air toxics sources from judicial review.30 Congress has
recognized that ordering decisions can prove controversial and generate major delays, but do not
themselves provide any public benefits. Since no benefits occur until the agency promulgates rules

See Eagle Picher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 910-911
(D.C. Cir. 1985)(describing the methodology used in hazard
ranking).
25

See id. at 919 (CERCLA contemplates that EPA will set
priorities for addressing releases).
26

27

42 U.S.C. § 7412(e).
Congress also authorized EPA to
consider efficiency of grouping categories together for ease of
regulation in setting a schedule. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(C).
28

See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g).

29

Id.

30

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(g)(3); 7412(e)(3).
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regulating the sources on a schedule, Congress has sometimes sought to avoid litigation of the
preliminary ordering step.
B. Selection
Perhaps the most important priority setting decisions in environmental law involve the selection
of pollutants for regulation.31 Either Congress or an administrative agency identifies some substance
that must be regulated and leaves other substances unregulated.32
Many of the major environmental statutes authorize EPA to list harmful pollutants for
regulation.33 Usually, EPA may list pollutants for regulation without firm proof of harm, because
Congress intended environmental regulation to prevent harms even in the face of scientific uncertainty.34

Accord John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of
Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV . 1, 2
(1997)(describing the question of “what to regulate” as “the
most fundamental question of all.”).
31

32

See id. at 2, 4.

See e.g. Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) v. Costle, 636
F.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(EPA's obligation to list toxic
pollutants for regulation under the Clean Water Act); EaglePicher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 926 (D.C. Cir.
1985)(CERCLA defines hazardous substances to include substances
listed by EPA under a variety of statutes).
33

See e.g. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941; Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(broad
definition of toxics in Clean Water Act design to protect
against “incompletely understood” dangers).
34
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For example, the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act authorized EPA to regulate pollutants
which “in his judgment has an adverse affect on public health.”35 The D.C. Circuit in dicta indicated
that this language required a showing of actual health effects and prohibited precautionary listing based
on possible dangers.36 Congress promptly amended the Act to affirm EPA’s authority to make
precautionary listing decisions, authorizing listing of pollutants that “cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”37 EPA eventually
listed six “criteria” pollutants for state regulation, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide,
ozone, and nitrogen oxide.38 The Clean Water Act also uses a precautionary approach, simply
requiring EPA to consider a pollutant’s toxicity, persistence, degradeability, and it potential affect on
organisms in the water in deciding whether to list a particular toxic pollutant for regulation.39
35

See Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 14.

36

Id. at 14-15.

37

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, §
401(a), 91 Stat. 685, 790 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7408); H.R.
Rep. No. 95- 294 at 43-51 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.A.A.N.
1077, 1121-1129 (explaining how Congress introduced more
explicit precautionary language throughout the Clean Air Act to
preserve EPA’s authority to regulate in the face of uncertainty,
notwithstanding the Ethyl case); U.S. v. Walsh, 783 F. Supp.
546, 552 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affirmed, 8 F. 3rd 659 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1081 (1994) (citing similar
language in section 112 of the CAA governing toxic pollutants).
38

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-10; 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.

See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 72-73
(D.C. Cir. 1978)(broad definition of toxic pollution intended to
allow protection against incompletely understood dangers). The
Act’s definition of conventional pollutants is even broader.
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(a), 1362(6); 40 C.F.R. § 401.16. EPA may
39
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Similarly, RCRA allows EPA to regulate hazardous waste through use of general characteristics
associated with health effects, rather than proof that a particular substance harms human health. RCRA
requires the promulgation of characteristics of hazardous waste.40 This takes into account toxicity, but
it also takes into account persistence, degradeability, potential for accumulation in tissue, flammability,
corrosiveness, and “other hazardous characteristics.”41 This open-ended criteria has led to the
promulgation of a fairly long list of hazardous wastes and a general test private parties must apply to
wastes that the agency itself has not listed (or even considered).42
In spite of Congressional support for a precautionary approach to listing, agency listing often
proceeds slowly. The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) required EPA to list toxic
pollutants and regulate them within 90 days.43 EPA listed only nine pollutants under this section (over a

also regulate “non-conventional” pollutants.
See Rybachek v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 904 f.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 25 F.3rd
2063, 2065 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Edison Electric Institute v. EPA,
2 F.3rd 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
40

41

See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a).

See 40 C.F.R. pt. 261; Dernbach, supra note 31, at 11
(EPA has developed a “master list” of 506 chemicals and chemical
classes regulated under RCRA).
42

43

Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1234
n. 6 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1)(1976)).
14

period of years not days).44 This program was effectively paralyzed by 1978.45 Lack of data about the
effects of pollutants contributed to a failure to list pollutants.46
Litigation following EPA’s failure to meet its deadlines for listing and regulating toxic substances
produced a consent decree that forced regulation of 65 additional “priority pollutants” and pollutant
categories.47 Environmental groups agreed to more relaxed criteria for standard setting in exchange for
agreement to regulate this group of priority pollutants.48 This list, however, may not have reflected
agency selection of pollutants. Rather, the list may reflect a combination of government, industry, and

44

See EDF, 636 F.2d at 1234 n. 6.

See Oliver Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants
Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10528 (Sept. 1991).
45

See Dernbach, supra note 31, at 8; Latin, supra note 16,
1307-09.
46

at

See Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) v. Gorsuch,
718 F.2d 1117, 1120(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219
(1984); Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV.
609 (1978); 40 C.F.R. § part 423 (appendix A).
47

48

See EDF, 636 F.2d at 1236 n. 22.
15

environmental group priorities, since the list came out of a consent decree.49 Congress subsequently
ratified the selection of most of the pollutants in the consent decree.50
Regulation of hazardous air pollutants has a similar history. Selection of pollutants for stringent
regulation based on health effects proved extremely slow and eventually a process other than
conventional agency priority setting produced a larger list. EPA regulated only 7 pollutants during the
first two decades of its administration of the CAA.51 In 1990, Congress itself listed 189 hazardous air
pollutants and generally required EPA to regulate them.52
Similarly, EPA has regulated very few substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)53 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),54 which apply cost-

See id. at 1234-1235; Dernbach, supra note 31, at 33-34
(discussing the reasons for selection of these priority
pollutants). While the industry groups involved in the initial
settlement did not appeal the District Court order granting the
initial settlement, see
id., some industry groups later
attacked it collaterally and challenged its enforcement and
modification.
See EDF, 636 F.2d at 1236-1238; CBE, 718 F.2d
1117.
49

50

See FRANK GRAD, 2 TREATISE

ON THE

E NVIRONMENT § 3.03[4] (1998).

See National Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3rd 1351, 1364 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
51

See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
See also Dernbach, supra
note
31, at 41-42 (discussing the history of the list’s development).
52

53

15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692.

54

7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.
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benefit tests to regulatory decisions.55 The cost-benefit test stimulated strong industry resistance to
providing data on health effects and led to paralyzing reversals in court, including a reversal of a ban on
asbestos, one of the most well documented threats to human health in the history of environmental
law.56
This history of paralysis illustrates an important point about priority setting. Agencies facing
large information gaps have often been unable to complete rulemakings deciding which toxic chemicals
to regulate. More than 10,000 potential toxic chemicals might require regulation.57 But EPA has never
succeeded in regulating more than a handful of substances, under TSCA and FIFRA’s cost-benefit
requirements.58
See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk:
Information Regulatory Policy and Toxic Substances Control, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 261, 269 (1991)
[hereinafter PERILS] (FIFRA and
TSCA
use
language
that
authorizes
action
to
prevent
"unreasonable" adverse effects and have legislative history
calling for balancing of costs and benefits); Alan Rosenthal,
George M. Gray, & John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable Cancer
Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 269, 304309 (1990) (referring to FIFRA and TSCA as risk-balancing
statutes); Corrosion Pipe Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217
(5th Cir. 1991) (describing statutory requirements of TSCA).
55

See Corrosion Pipe, 947 F.2d 1201; Driesen, supra note 8,
at 596.
56

See D AN FAGAN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, TOXIC DECEPTION: HOW THE CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE, BENDS THE LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTH xvii
(70,000 chemicals in commerce, including more than a billion
pounds of pesticides annually).
57

See McGarity, supra note 3, at 541-549 (a cost-benefit
requirement and hard look judicial review ended regulation under
section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act); Jay Michaelson,
Note, Rethinking Regulatory Reform:
Toxics, Politics, and
Ethics, 105 YALE L. J. 1891, 1902
(1996) ("EPA is woefully
58
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Pollution control statutes also contain provisions that allow agencies to delist substances. For
example, section 112 of the CAA authorizes EPA to delist Congressionally listed hazardous substance
shown to be safe.59 Similar provisions exist in other statutes.60
C. Allocation
Congress makes allocative decisions in the budget making process.61 Congress decides how
much money to give each regulatory agency. If often dedicates funds to particular programs within
agencies.62 These fairly broad decisions influence allocation of funds that can finance rulewriting,

inefficient at setting numerical limits for toxic substances"
having set only 17 exposure limits in 20 years under TSCA); See
Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation
on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10
YALE J. ON REG. 369, 437-438 (1993). See also Applegate, supra note
55, at 318-19 (only a handful of test rules have been
promulgated under TSCA).
59

See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(3)(A).

See e.g. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d
1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(Congress gave EPA the authority to
delete toxic pollutants from the list established under the
Clean Water Act); U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 829 F. Supp.
1023 (N.D. Indiana 1993), affirmed in part and vacated in part,
38 F.3rd 862 (7th Cir. 1995)(adjudicating claim that petition
for delisting waste under RCRA should offer a defense to
enforcement).
60

See generally Max Reynolds, The Impact of Congressional
Rules on Appropriations Law, 12 J. L. & POLITICS 481 (1996).
61

See N ATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (NAPA), SETTING
PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS at 150 (1995)(describing how “earmarking”
by Congress limits EPA’s ability to allocate money based on
risk)
62
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adjudication, and enforcement among the various regulatory agencies and their programs. Congress
controls the allocation of funds between different regulatory programs with different goals.63
Some of these allocation decisions really function as selection decisions, a type of secondary
priority setting. Congress, especially in recent years, has sometimes passed appropriations riders
(prohibitions on expenditures for particular purposes attached to long budget bills) to forbid the
expenditure of monies for specified purposes.64 For example, recent Congresses have passed
appropriations riders forbidding expenditures aimed at addressing global climate change, a problem
EPA and its Scientific Advisory Board ranks high among its list of priorities.65 But aside from
appropriations riders, Congress usually allocates funds to various programs with the apparent goal of
making sure that the agencies execute the programmatic instructions in substantive legislation.66
Agencies generally have to make decisions about how much time and money to devote to
various regulatory tasks within the formidable constraints Congress imposes. Thus agency managers
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97 YALE

See generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse,
L. J. 1343 (1988).

See Sanda Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity
at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crises,
21 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 457 (1997).
64

See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 97 (1987); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY SCIENCE
ADVISORY
BOARD ,
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 3 (1990)[hereinafter, SAB STUDY].
65

Adam M. Finkel, Should We-and Can We-Reduce the Worst
Things First?, in WORST THINGS FIRST?
THE DEBATE OVER R ISK-BASED
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL P RIORITIES at 5 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic
Golding eds. 1994)(95% of EPA’s budget subject to Congressional
mandates).
66
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must decide how many people to assign to several rulemaking projects going on at the same time and
how much money to devote to financing contractors to provide additional information within the
constraints Congressional earmarking imposes.67
Congress through substantive legislation determines the criteria that apply to determining the
stringency of various types of regulation. Agencies implementing pollution control statutes translate
these general instructions into specific decisions about the stringency of each regulation it promulgates,
unless Congress itself has made very specific decisions.68 These decisions may affect the amount of
money regulated companies pay to comply with regulatory requirements. This in turn effects allocation
of company resources, both employee time and money . It forces managers to divert resources that it
may have devoted to advertising, product improvement, developing new products, and enriching
managers or shareholders to pay employees or contractors to make environmental improvements.
Managers must, in short, give environmental protection a greater priority than they would have without
the standard. Stringent standards will usually (but not always) divert more private sector monies to
compliance than less stringent standards.
III. Priority Setting in the Regulatory Reform Debate
Claims that society sets its regulatory priorities badly have become a staple of the regulatory
reform debate. This part surveys some of the more prominent claims and shows that critics of
government priority setting have been less than clear about what they mean by setting priorities. It then
See NAPA, supra note 62, at 158-62 (describing how EPA
deploys staff informally to try and target high risk).
67

See e.g. David M. Driesen, Five Lessons from the Clean
Air Act’s Implementation, 14 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 51, 52-55 (1996).
68
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contrasts the evidence of poor priority setting that the critics put forward with the evidence an adequate
conceptual framework and knowledge of the law of priority setting might lead one to expect.
Regulatory reformers have provided very little information relevant to assessing the claim that regulatory
priorities are seriously askew.

A. Stephen Breyer’s Breaking the Vicious Circle
Harvard law professor Stephen Breyer wrote a very influential book on regulatory reform prior
to becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward More Effective Risk
Regulation.69 This book advocates a shift in how we set priorities, insulation of regulators from
Congressional control of agency agendas.70
For my purposes, Justice Breyer’s diagnosis of priority setting problems is of more interest than
his reform proposal. Justice Breyer identifies three “major” problems with the current regulatory
system, which he labels “tunnel vision (or “the last 10 percent”), random agency selection, and
inconsistency.71
He defines “tunnel vision” as carrying “single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point
where it does more harm than good.”72 He then provides examples of what he considers overly
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Breyer, supra note 1.

See Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
449, 461 (1995) (book review)(“Breyer’s book is, perhaps most of
all, a call for better prioritization.”)
70

71

BREYER, supra note 1, at 10.

72

Id. at 11.
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stringent regulation and suggests that such excess is pervasive.73 In each case, Justice Breyer uses a
dollars per lives saved metric to evaluate whether regulation is too stringent. In other words, he reaches
his conclusion that tunnel vision is an important problem through application of CBA, and a rather crude
and incomplete version of CBA at that. His analysis does not consider avoided sickness and harms to
ecosystems as a benefit of regulation, only avoided human deaths.74 Because of this some of Justice
Breyer’s critics accuse him of a kind of tunnel vision of his own.75
He does not, however, argue explicitly for either CBA or allocative efficiency. He simply
assumes that outcomes that differ from those dictated by a crude version of that methodology are bad.
His conclusion about the significance of this “tunnel vision,” defined as regulations having high marginal
cost per life saved, addresses priority setting. He argues that the tunnel vision argument supports “a
serious effort to prioritize, and perhaps to reallocate, our regulatory resources.”76 He does not explain
what he means by prioritizing, reallocation, or regulatory resources.
Justice Breyer then turns his attention to “random agenda selection.”77 This reference to agenda
setting seems to address the kind of priority setting that I have identified as “selection,” deciding to
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Id. at 11-18.

See Heinzerling, supra note 70, at 463 (by reductions in
ecosystem harms and human illness, Breyer has underestimated
regulatory benefits).
74

See id., at 465. See also Flatt, supra note 15, at 17131725 (describing values other than reducing human death that are
relevant).
75

76

BREYER, supra note 1, at 19.

77

Id. at 19-20.
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perform some tasks and not others. Indeed, he begins by discussing the problem of EPA regulating
only a small fraction of the 60,000 toxic chemicals then on the market, suggesting a need for more
careful selection.78
But this conceptual clarity soon evaporates, as Justice Breyer contrasts EPA’s views about
which environmental problems merit high priority treatment with those of the public.79 At this point,
Breyer apparently recognizes that EPA has not suggested that its low or medium priorities should be
left off its agenda,80 and he writes about agency “priorities and agendas” mirroring public rather than
expert judgment.81 Apparently, this dual reference flags some sort of priority setting in addition to
agenda setting, something more than selection. To make matters worse, he closes this discussion of
agenda selection with a reference to one of his examples of overly stringent regulation.82 At this point,
the reader cannot tell whether his agenda setting discussion focuses upon priority setting, or the need
to reduce the stringency of regulation hinted at earlier. I will discuss the relationship between the
stringency of regulation and priority setting in part four. Understanding this relationship helps clarify an
important confusion in the regulatory reform debate.
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Id.

79

Id. at 20.

See EPA, supra note 65, at 3 (listing legislative and
political support as a factor that should influence priority
setting).
80

81

Breyer, supra note 1, at 20.

82

Id.
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Finally, Justice Breyer turns his attention to the problem of “inconsistency.” Under this rubric,
Breyer briefly addresses a host of potential problems. He first discusses the use of different risk
estimation methods among agencies.83 He states that “regulators implicitly attach” widely varying values
to statistical lives saved.84 He then turns his attention to problems that seem to have nothing to do with
consistency. He discusses regulators’ failure to attend to “one program’s safety or environmental
effects upon another” and other unintended consequences.85 Still under the rubric of consistency, he
returns to his cost-benefit and allocation themes. He suggests that spending too much on “small risks”,
a failure to observe cost-benefit principles, is not only uneconomic, but often fatal.86 He talks about
how imposing costs for environmental cleanup deprives individuals of income. This deprivation can
lead to poor diet, more heart attacks, and suicide, says Breyer.87
He returns to his priority setting theme, in a manner suggestive of concern about allocative
priority setting, by claiming that concrete possibilities exist for obtaining “increased health, safety, and
environmental benefits through reallocation of regulatory resources.”88 Here he gives some examples of
good ways to spend money, but does not specify which resources he proposes to use for this purpose.
Part four will return to this problem.
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Id. at 21.
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Id. at 22.
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Id. at 22-23.
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See id. at 23.
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Id.

88

Id.
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In short, Breyer’s concept of priority setting is extremely unclear. He tends to treat overly
stringent regulation as a form of poor prioritizing, but does not explain what stringency has to do with
priority setting.
Some commentators criticize Breyer’s description of regulation, stating that he provides a
skewed picture of government regulation.89 Many more disagree with his recommendation to solve the
problems of tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency, protecting a bureaucracy from
the influence of public opinion, so that expert opinion can independently create environmental policy.90

See e.g. Heinzerling, supra note 70; David A. Wirth &
Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1857, 1880
(1995)(book review)(Breyer recites a “highly selective, onesided litany of supposedly absurd regulatory requirements.”);
Flatt, supra note 15, at 1712 (faulting Breyer for failing to
distinguish
between
“isolated
examples”
and
“structural
deficiencies”); Oliver Houck, Risk Management Gone too Far, ENV’T
FORUM 8 (March/April 1994) (case histories focus on examples of
regulation going too far rather than the many cases where it did
not go far enough).
89

See e.g. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 86-89; David
A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities:
The Promise of a
Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U.L. REV. 365, 379-381 (1994) (book
review); Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 89, at 1889-1893; Houck,
supra note 89, at 9 (explaining why he finds Breyer’s proposal
“disturbing”); Todd C. Zuble, Breaking the Vicious Circle:
Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 241, 247
(1994)(book note)(criticizing Breyer’s failure to limit his
proposed bureaucracy’s power). Cf. Barry Sullivan, Democracy,
Bureaucracy, and Science: Making the Trains Run on Time, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 166, 176-190 (1994)(book review)(gently critiquing
Breyer’s proposal); Craig Gannett, Congress and the Reform of
Risk Regulation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2095, 2100 (1994) (suggesting
a need for greater clarity about the limits of Breyer’s agency’s
political authority); Stephen F. Williams, Risk Regulation and
Its Hazards, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1498 (1995) (expressing doubts about
the political acceptability of Breyer’s remedy).
90
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None of these criticisms go to the heart of the problem of interest here, what sort of priority
setting does Breyer address? This matters, because Breyer’s views about the current state of the
regulatory system have proven influential, even if his recommendation for reform has not. Indeed,
while Breyer himself did not recommend increased reliance upon CBA in this book, both supporters of
regulatory reform in the Congress and prominent academics have used his view of regulation to support
increased use of CBA as a means of improving priority setting.91
B. Sunstein’s Endorsement of Cost-Benefit Analysis to Improve Priority Setting
Cass Sunstein identifies the need for better priority setting as the first lesson we all have learned
from regulation since the New Deal. 92 Citing Breyer, Sunstein claims that “resources for risk reduction
are badly allocated.”93 Better allocation, Sunstein claims, would save either more lives or allow us to
save the same number of lives at lower cost.94 Like Breyer, he does not discuss which resources he
proposes to reallocate or how. But initially, he seems to be discussing some form of secondary
allocative priority setting, perhaps selection.

See Republican National Committee, Contract with America
131-132 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994)(faulting
Congress for failing to assure the regulation’s benefits
outweigh costs, for not pursuing “integrated health and safety
goals” and for attacking whatever health risk has caught the
public’s attention, even if it exacerbates other health risks.);
Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4; Sunstein, Foreword, supra
note 1, at 257-260; Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 1.
91

92

Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 257-260.

93

Id. at 257.

94

Id. at 262.
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He then goes on to a problem with no obvious connection to priority setting, regulations that he
claims offer too few benefits to justify their costs.95 Like Breyer, he criticizes the unevenness in the
amount of private compliance cost dollars spent per lives saved across regulatory programs.96 He then
discusses, as Breyer did, inconsistency in agency risk assessment procedures.97
Throughout this discussion he refers to the “goal of achieving sensible priority setting.”98 He
finds “good priority setting” unlikely because of the inconsistencies he has cited.99
He does not explain how inconsistencies in risk assessment and regulatory stringency affect
priority setting. He does not clarify what he means by priority setting and why these inconsistencies
undermine good priority setting. He assumes some relationship between even dollars per life saved
results, standardized risk assessment, and good priority setting. But he does not explain why these
things are related.
Sunstein makes a number of recommendations for regulatory reform.100 Since my aim here is
simply to set our prioritizing talk straight, I plan to focus on Sunstein’s principle recommendation for
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Id. at 258.
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Id. at 258-59.
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Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 257-260.
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Id. at 258-260.

99

Id. at 260.

Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 53-

54.

See e.g. id. at 257-268 (recommending “better priority
setting,” use of “market-based incentives,” avoidance of
“unintended consequences,” collection of better information,
responsiveness to both citizen and expert judgment about risk,
and reliance upon performance rather than design standards).
100
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improving priority setting, increased use of CBA. Sunstein generally endorses CBA, in large part,
because he believes it encourages better priority setting. 101
C. Evidence of Poor Priority Setting in the Regulatory Reform Debate
The evidence of poor priority setting that Breyer, Sunstein, and other regulatory reformers put
forward differs markedly from what any common sense concept of government priority setting and
knowledge of the law governing it would lead one to expect. Spelling out the kind of inquiry a common
sense concept of priority setting invites will help make this apparent.
The regulatory reformers, including Sunstein and Breyer, show no concern about ordering.
But many people may think of ordering first when they think about setting their priorities straight. Some
people even establish priorities by writing lists of important tasks in a rank order.
This lack of concern for ordering means that the regulatory reform debate’s priority setting
rhetoric appears misleading. After all, ordering involves perhaps the most neutral form of priority
setting. Ordering government priorities does not, for example, involve expansion or contraction of
regulatory programs or implicate the stringency of regulation. The regulatory reformer’s use of the
priority setting theme conveys the relative neutrality that criticism of ordering implies, but the details of
the criticism do not address ordering.
The regulatory reformers do not discuss rulemaking or statutes that establish an order of
operations. We have no idea whether regulatory reformers consider the ranking of superfund sites, the

See Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 1, at 2 (CBA is a way
of
“ensuring
better
priority-setting
and
of
overcoming
predictable obstacles to desirable regulation”); Pildes &
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 52.
101
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order EPA and Congress have established for regulating hazardous air pollution sources, or the
decision to regulate large point sources of water pollution first reflects poor priority setting.
Knowledgeable discussion of such matters would carefully consider the criteria Congress imposes upon
EPA to establish an order and EPA’s execution of this ordering. It would come to grips with the issues
these criteria and EPA’s execution raise in a concrete way. And reform recommendations would flow
from the evaluation of this experience. None of this figures at all in the work of the principal writers
about priority improving regulatory reform.
Similarly, selection does not seem central to their concerns. The law of selection shows that an
analyst wishing to think concretely about priority setting as selection has some data sets to work from.
EPA has selected a handful of pollutants for intensive state regulation under the Clean Air Act.102 The
regulatory reformers express no views about whether these “criteria” pollutants merit this special
attention. If they do not think that lead,103 ozone,104 carbon monoxide,105 sulfur oxides,106 particulate
matter,107 and nitrogen oxides108 merit this attention, perhaps they should explain why not. On the other
hand, if EPA chose these pollutants wisely, perhaps government selective priority setting has been
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a); 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.12.
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.9-.10.
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.8.
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.5.
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.6-.7.
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.11.
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pretty good. Regulatory reformers have equally little to say about the selection of priority pollutants
under the Clean Water Act,109 the list of hazardous air pollutants regulated under the CAA,110 or any
similar exercise in selection. If a serious selection problem exists, one would expect these lists to show
many glaring mistakes.111
Breyer and Sunstein have very little to say about selection. Sunstein addresses selection in a
brief and very puzzling passage. He claims that agencies have substantially different standards for
deciding whether to regulate at all.112 He then cites varying probabilities of cancer risk that serve, he
says, as regulatory triggers at various agencies.113 But Sunstein does not make a normative case for
setting a single numerical estimate of cancer risk as the criterion for initiating regulation. Indeed, he
states that “a single number may not make sense in light of different contextual judgments.”114 Given
that statement, his conclusion that “good priority setting is unlikely” in the face of these variations seems
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See 40 C.F.R. pt. 423 appendix A.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a).
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I do not mean to suggest that the selection of pollutants
is perfect, only that regulatory reformers do not grapple with
the issues the lists raise. Cf. Dernback, supra note 31.
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Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 259-260.
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Id.
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Id. at 260.
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baffling.115 To the extent agencies are making judgments based on numerous contextual factors, one
would expect variations, even substantial variations, in any single metric.116
Breyer’s book briefly mentions the problem of EPA not securing enough information about
toxic chemicals under TSCA.117 This makes it difficult for EPA to carefully select chemicals for
regulation.
Breyer then mentions complaints that EPA overemphasizes cancer rather than neurological
risk.118 He recognizes that “some neurotoxins are regulated as carcinogens,” but “neurotoxic effects
receive little special attention.”119 This reference to “special attention” raises the possibility that this
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Id. at 260.

See e.g. SAB STUDY , supra note 19, at 17 (recommending
that EPA “attach as much importance to reducing ecological risk
as it does to reducing health risk”).
116

Breyer, supra note 1, at 19-20. See also Applegate, supra
note 55, at 318-30 (explaining how TSCA’s unreasonable risk
standard for requiring testing has tended to discourage
information gathering and recommending reforms).
117

Id. at 20. Cf. Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (upholding EPA
listing of the neurotoxin, lead, as a criteria pollutant);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (upholding EPA’s phasedown of lead in
gasoline); Acorn v. Edwards, 81 F.3rd 1387, 1388-89 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1129 (1997)(discussing the Lead
Contamination Control Act of 1988); Adamo Wrecking v. EPA, 434
U.S. 275, 297 n.9 (1977)(dissent)(mentioning that mercury, a
neurotoxin, has been regulated as a toxic pollutant under the
Clean Air Act); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. 693,
701-702(2000)(referring to Clean Water Act standards for
mercury).
118
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complaint about lack of “special attention” might refer to a problem of inadequate stringency of
regulations addressing neurotoxic carcinogens or inadequate information gathering, rather than a
problem of selection of substances for government regulation.120
Regulatory reformers devote scant attention to selection and none at all to ordering. Their chief
concerns lie far from the common sense notion of priority setting as either ordering or selection.
Both Sunstein and Breyer place major emphasis on improving the allocation of resources, thus
suggesting a concern with allocative priority setting.129 Yet, they say nothing concrete about
Congressional budgetary processes that govern allocation of most money among competing regulatory
programs or about management decisions assigning agency personnel and contractor dollars to
competing regulations within programs.
Breyer, Sunstein, and other regulatory reformers focus upon claims that EPA’s expert views
about the relative seriousness of various environmental problems do not match those of the general

Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory
Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 646 n. 200 (1996)(discussing
lack of available risk assessment techniques for neurotoxicity);
Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 89, at 1865 (claiming that cancer
tends to take precedence over other risks because risk
assessment methods are available to estimate low dose cancer
risks); Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental
Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 286 n. 57 (as of 1997,
scientists had not developed low cost screening tests for
neurotoxicity); 64 Fed. Reg. 42945 (Aug. 6, 1999)(requiring
neurotoxic testing for a limited group of pesticides); EPA,
Principles of Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 59 Fed. Reg. 42360
(Aug. 17, 1994).
120

See Breyer, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing possible need
to reallocate “regulatory resources”); Sunstein, Foreword, supra
note 1, at 257-258 (developing point that “resources for risk
reduction” are badly allocated).
129
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public. Breyer and Sunstein tell us that EPA has indicated that the priorities it considers most important
did not match its actual allocation of resources.130 This suggests some concern with allocation of
government resources.
Let us assume that EPA experts are correct, that their views do not track the public’s incorrect
view, and that allocation of government resources is not proportional to the relative importance of
competing environmental programs. The conceptual framework in part one invites further questions
that the regulatory reformers do not ask. First of all, does this lack of correspondence between funding
and importance involve any priority setting at all? Suppose that some tasks are more difficult to
accomplish than others. If this is the case, than a government committed to an appropriate set of tasks
might allocate resource unevenly based on the relative difficulty of competing tasks rather than their
relative importance.
Justice Breyer states that a major concern involves the failure of Congress to fund pursuit of
EPA’s highest priorities (such as indoor air pollution and climate change), while it continues to fund
hazardous waste clean-up, a low EPA priority, rather well. 131 This, of course, suggests not poor

See BREYER, supra note 1, at 20; Pildes & Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 36-37; FREDERICK ALLEN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. Cf.
EPA, supra note 65, at xvii (EPA made no decisions that one type
of risk was more important than another and did not add risks
for a problem across different types of risk).
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See EPA, supra note 65, at xvii (citing the need for
effective application of EPA’s own finite resources as the
reason for the Unfinished Business analysis)[emphasis added]; F.
Henry Habicht, EPA’s Vision for Setting National Priorities, in
WORST THINGS FIRST?, supra note 66, at 50-51; Breyer, supra note 1,
at 20.
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agency priority setting, but poor Congressional allocation of funds.132 Yet, Sunstein and many other
regulatory reformers devote little attention to budgetary issues, focusing their recommendations on
changes in administrative agency decision-making procedures.133
This lack of focus on budget causes most regulatory reformers to fail to address issues crucial
to the budgetary concerns underlying the EPA report on priority setting that they both refer to in
discussing these problems.134 Government has funded superfund (a low EPA priority) through a
dedicated tax on the industries manufacturing the chemicals piled up in toxic waste dumps.135 This may

See SAB S TUDY , supra note 65, at 3 (explaining that
Congress largely determines agency priorities and budget). This
report focused its recommendations upon EPA, probably because
EPA, not Congress, asked for guidance. Id. at ii, 6. See also
Frederick W. Allen, Differing Views of Risk: The Challenge For
Decision-Making in a Democracy, presented at Only Earth Forum on
Managing Hazardous Materials at The Rene Dubois Center for Human
Environments,
Inc.,
New
York
City,
17-18
(May
25-26,
1988)(framing the major issue as legislative and budget
priorities tracking public rather than expert opinion); NAPA,
supra note 62, at 153 (specific directions from Congress
accounts for nearly all of the agent’s budgetary priorities,
thus precluding agency reliance upon risk assessment to set
budgetary priorities).
132

Cf. NAPA, supra note 62, at 147-158 (describing the
budget process).
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See EPA, supra note 65, at xix (discussing lack of
correspondence between EPA’s assessment of risk and EPA
“effort”); Hornstein, supra note 54, at 377-388 (discussing EPA’s
integration of risk-based priorities into budget processes);
Donald Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law:
A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 564
(1992)(citing Office of Management and Budget efforts to use
comparative risk analysis to determine the flow of money to
federal programs).
134

135

See 42 U.S.C. § 9611; 26 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1).
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help explain the relatively healthy state of EPA’s superfund budget. Yet Sunstein and most other
regulatory reformers do not discuss abolishing the superfund tax or taxing something else to fund
different priorities.136 Thus, they do not grapple with the issue of whether it really makes sense to leave
toxic waste dumps lying around without cleanup, or the implications of milder reforms aimed at the
budgetary problem. 137
Cf. Katherine D. Walker, March Sadowitz, and John D.
Graham, Confronting Superfund Mythology:
The Case of Risk
Assessment and Management, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND 30-32 (Richard L.
Revesz and Richard B. Stewart eds. 1995)[hereinafter SUPERFUND]
(both cancer and non-cancer risk at Superfund sites justify
remedial action).
136
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Breyer does suggest that the expert government agency he
proposes might obtain funds for vaccinations by looking for
“practical ways to settle some toxic waste dump cases.”
See
Breyer, supra note 70, at 67. This proposal suffers from the
same problem that afflicts many other regulatory reform
arguments, it does not explain whether private sector or public
sector resources would fund the vaccinations. Breyer may have
in mind that the settlements would impose less stringent cleanup obligations upon regulated parties and that this would free
up additional resources to fund vaccinations.
But less
stringent clean-up obligations would allow private parties to
simply keep their money, and would not directly create funding
for childhood vaccinations.
Perhaps Breyer means that
government would save enforcement resources through settlement
and that his expert agency should have authority to use those
saved resources to fund a non-environmental risk reduction
program. Breyer offers an alternative solution that does not
suffer from this pubic/private confusion, taxing toxic chemicals
to fund childhood vaccination.
Id.
But, as Professor
Heinzerling points out, this suggestion seems inconsistent with
Breyer’s view that the risks from toxic substances have been
exaggerated. See Heinzerling, supra note 70, at 469. It also
raises issues about the limits of the appropriate authority for
his proposed group and fairness to the chemical manufacturers.
See National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S.
336, 341 (1973)(questioning legitimacy of delegating taxation
authority to a regulatory agency).
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They also do not discuss the causes of the high costs of Superfund cleanup. First and foremost,
unlike many regulatory programs, this program focuses upon cleaning up pollution after it goes into the
environment.138 Cleanup often costs more than pollution prevention. A related problem complicates
Superfund cleanup. Since the dumping that occurred took place in the past, figuring out who should
pay for clean-up is far more complicated than figuring out who should be responsible for ongoing
pollution.139 Also, because each Superfund site offers, at least initially, a black box containing a unique
problem, figuring out what to do is inherently inefficient.140 EPA must proceed through case by case
investigations, administrative decisions, negotiations, and adjudication.141 For many other problems,

See e.g. United States v. Occidental Petroleum, 200 F.3rd
143, 146 (3rd Cir. 1999)(describing remediation of already
contanimated sites as CERCLA’s most important essential
purpose).
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See Lloyd S. Dixon, The Transaction “Costs Generated by
Superfund’s Liability Approach, in SUPERFUND, supra note 136, at
172-74, 176 (discussing how the existence of multiple
potentially liable parties generates high transaction costs).
See e.g. Sun Company Inc. v. Brown-Ferris, 124 F.3rd 1187,
1193(10th Cir. 1997)(discussing problem of “orphan shares,”
clean-up costs left over because some contributors to a toxic
waste spite have vanished or become insolvent).
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See e.g. National Association of Manufacturers v. Dep’t
of Interior, 134 F.3rd 1095(D.C. Cir. 1998)(rejecting challenge
to methods for assessment of damages to natural resources);
Kenecott Copper Corp. v. Department of Interior, 88 F.3rd 1191,
1219 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing need to have site assessment
methods
sufficiently
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to
address
“the
unique
circumstances of each case.”)
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See Richard B. Stewart, Confidentiality in Government
Enforcement Proceedings, 2 N.Y.U. E NVTL . L. J. 232, 235-36
(1993)(describing the case-by-case process); Kelley v. EPA, 15
F.3rd 1100, 1104-1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.
American Banker’s Association v. Kelley, 513 U.S. 1110
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EPA can use the much more efficient method of broad industry-wide rulemaking to address
problems.142 This means, of course, that the disproportionate funding may reflect a difficulty allocation,
rather than priority setting.
Commentators that appreciate these problems tend to come to different conclusions than the
scholars who have led the mainstream debate on regulatory reform. For example, a coalition of
environmental groups and regulated companies agreed that more definite prospective standard setting
would help speed up clean-up.143 Unfortunately, Congress did not enact this reform proposal. 144 I do
not mean to suggest that Superfund would not benefit from regulatory reform. I just mean that the
regulatory reformers’ discussion of priority setting in this context suffers from a lack of serious interest in
the actual allocation of government resources.
Justice Breyer, after making the briefest mention of EPA’s concern about budgetary allocation,
refers the reader to a superfund clean-up with very high costs relative to benefits. This stringency
concern really lies at the heart of the regulatory reformers’ concerns. Breyer and Sunstein both suggest

(1995)(holding that EPA has no rulemaking authority to broadly
determine liability issues under CERLCLA). Cf. Chemical
Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. EPA, 26 F. Supp. 180, 185 n. 4 (D.D.C.
1998)(suggesting EPA may have authority to write a settlement
policy under CERCLA).
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See e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412; 7411.

See Rena Steinzor, The Reauthorization of Superfund: Can
the Deal of the Century be Saved?, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10009 (1995).
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See Time Restraints, Wrangling Kill Reform Bill: New
Effort to Change CERCLA Promised Next Year, 25 ENV. REP. 1172
(1994).
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that government regulates many problems too stringently and a few not stringently enough.145 Sunstein
clearly equates regulations generating costs exceeding benefits with poor priority setting.146
Regulatory reformers do not discuss stringency in any systematic manner either. Certain kinds
of information seem quite germane to debates about relative stringency. For example, while EPA has
regulated many chemicals, it has banned very few. One might examine whether the bans (e.g. DDT,147
ozone depleting chemicals,148 lead in gasoline149) have applied to important or trivial risks and how they
affected society.
One might also get at policy decisions about stringency by comparing statutory criteria. For
example, the Clean Air and Water Acts have rather absolute health and environmental goals, while

See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 99; Breyer, supra
note 1, at 11-29, 56.
145

See Sunstein, Legislative Foreword, supra note 1, at 257
n. 35 and accompanying text (citing statements about costs
exceeding benefits to support claim that “resources for risk
reduction are badly allocated” under a heading stating that
“Government should engage in better priority setting”).
146
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Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)(affirming ban of DDT).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7671c-e.
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42 U.S.C. § 7545(n).
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TSCA authorizes cost-benefit balancing. 150 One might ask whether a substantial reason exists to
regulate less strictly under TSCA than we do under the air and water acts.151
Basically, the regulatory reformers rely upon anecdote to suggest that environmental law is too
strict. Indeed, Breyer admits that his examples of regulatory problems are “selective” and “focus on
extremes.”152
Most CBA supporters rely heavily upon a table listing dollars per lives saved numbers for
regulations to justify their support of greater reliance upon CBA in regulatory proceedings.153 This table
covers only a small smattering of regulations that the table’s author, Office of Management and Budget
economist John Morrall, has selected.154 Professor Heinzerling has shown that the Morrall table

Compare Corrosion Pipe Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201,
1217 (5th Cir. 1991)(requiring a cost-benefit approach to TSCA,
while adjudicating a rulemaking addressing many asbestos
sources)) with Lead Industries v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1980)(forbidding consideration of cost in setting national
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, while
recognizing that state pollution control standards to meet this
goal may involve cost considerations); Environmental Protection
Agency v. National Crushed Stone.
150

See Driesen, supra note 8, at 562-563 (suggesting that
the difference in statutory criteria may serve the aim of equity
toward polluting industries, since the air and water acts focus
upon pollution control while TSCA and FIFRA contemplate product
bans).
151
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See Breyer, supra note 1, at 28.

Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,
107 YALE L. J. 1981, 1983, 1993-98 (1998)(describing the influence
of Morrall’s table).
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See id. at 1999-2017.
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contains major errors.155 Morrall includes rules that were never promulgated as examples of extreme
regulation and often uses his own estimates of the value of regulatory benefits, even though Breyer cites
this table as a compendium of information based upon EPA’s own valuation of regulatory benefits.156
This reliance upon selective anecdotal information makes the reformers’ claims about the state
of regulation and appropriate directions for reform suspect.157 But I am more concerned here with
trying to understand how information about variations in dollars per lives saved cost-benefit ratios
conceptually relates to priority setting claims.
A stringency concern seems to undergird the constant reference to the variance in private sector
dollars spent per statistical life saved in the regulatory reform literature. Regulatory reformers
apparently believe that the private sector dollars spent per life saved should be reasonably even across
regulatory programs. Regulatory reformers regularly claim that the Morrall table shows poor priority
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See id. at 1984-1985, 2000-2014.

Id. at 2000-2042.
Cf. Breyer, supra note 1, at 22.
Breyer relies upon a later version of the Morrall table, but
that version like the original, discounted the agencies’
estimates of lives saved. See Heinzerling, supra note 153 at
1995-98 (explaining that her criticisms apply to all versions of
the table in circulation, including the version Breyer relies
upon). In addition, the table excludes very cost effective rules
for which information was available at the time of publication.
Id. at 2014-2015.
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See NAPA, supra note 62, at 50 (citing Breyer’s use of the
Morrall table as an example of reducing “complex decisions to
just a few variables” and characterizing the table as
“insufficient for . . .serious risk-management decisions.”).
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setting.158 But they have never explained what this table has to do with priority setting or why it
supports the need for CBA. The table has no obvious connection to government priority setting. It
does not address ordering or establish that any particular problem should be added to or subtracted
from government’s agenda. Rather, the table seems to suggest that some regulations are too stringent.
In the next part, I attempt to link priority setting with the stringency concerns suggested by the
Morrall able. I will only partially succeed. My strained and limited success will, in turn, generate some
insights into the regulatory reform debate’s emphasis on CBA.
IV. Stringency, Priority Setting, and CBA-Based Regulatory Reform
Stringency seems to have little to do with government priority setting. For example, let us
assume that we agree that government should regulate problems in order of their danger to society.
Government can follow this principle and still regulate too weakly or too stringently. Similarly, the
government can have its ordering priorities completely wrong and regulate perfectly, but in the wrong
order. This is true no matter what criteria we use to sort good from bad regulation.
Similarly, the government can select the most important problems for action and still regulate the
right problems stupidly. The government can also select less important problems for action and regulate

See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America:
Risk
Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653,
657 (1993); 141 CONG. REC. S2042 (daily ed. February 2,
1995)(statement of Senator Murkowski)(arguing that regulatory
priorities are often a result of “overreaction.”); Regulatory
Reform:
Hearings on S. 343 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 87, 89 (1995)(statement of Cass R.
Sunstein).
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these problems appropriately, while neglecting more important problems. Again, this is true regardless
of what criteria we use to sort good from bad regulation.
The first part of this article, however, noted that government regulations can affect private
sector resource allocation. This provides the key to trying to understand the regulatory reformers’ use
of stringency concerns to support the existence of serious defects in priority setting. This part analyzes
this connection between stringency and private resource allocation and then explains the implications of
that analysis for the regulatory reform debate, especially as it pertains to CBA.
A. Stringency and Private Priority Setting
Government regulations typically generate private sector compliance expenditures. Private
companies must get the money to pay for these expenditures from somewhere. If possible, they will
raise prices and extract the money from their customers.
1. Consumer Allocation
Raised prices may mean that the regulated producers’ customers may pay more for the
producers’ products and have less money to spend on other goods and services.159 This means that
regulation, in effect, may cause consumers to allocate more resources to regulated goods and services
and less to other goods and services.
It seems a little strained to view this reallocation of consumer monies as a form of regulatory
priority setting, i.e. as an activity establishing priorities among various threats to public health and safety.
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This assumes that consumers’ budget constraints remain
constant. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE E CONOMICS 4 (3rd ed. 1993).
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The consumer may have the same priorities as before the regulation.160 And she may make purchase
decisions that do not involve her in any decisions about health and safety at all.
Assume that an automobile manufacturer raises its car prices because of regulation. Let us
suppose that a consumer, call her Sue, longs to own one of this company’s cars. Surely, she values the
car as highly after the price increase as she did before it; her desire remains undiminished.161 But the
added cost may make it harder for her to buy car.
On the other hand, purchasing the car at the raised price may change the list of tasks she can
accomplish. She could have bought the car and still gone on vacation before the regulation. Now,
however, she may not have the money to pay for her vacation because of the raised price (I am
assuming an unusually expensive regulation).162 This invites the question of whether the regulation has
changed her selective priority setting.
Priority setting usually refers only to voluntary selection. When prices rise, our wealth
diminishes and we must make do under tighter constraints. But we usually do not speak of added
constraints as something that changes our priorities. We recognize that priority setting takes place in a
context of constraints. Indeed, priority setting exists precisely because of constraints. If we had all of
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Economists typically assume that consumer preferences are
stable, even if their purchase patterns vary over time.
See
e.g. id. at 117.
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In terms of economic theory, Sue has a “reservation
price” reflecting the maximum she is “willing to pay” for the
car. See id. at 4.
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Of course, if her budget were very tight, even an
inexpensive regulation may affect her ability to go on vacation.
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the time in the world, we might do everything. Since we do not, we must leave some tasks undone.
Constraints may make priority setting more important, but that does not mean the constraints change
our priorities.
Sue must carry on priority setting within stricter budgetary constraints. Perhaps her activities
change but her priorities have not.
This contrasts with her own decisions about how to allocate her resources within given
restraints. For example, if Sue decides to work fewer hours in order to spend more time at home with
her young child, this decision might reduce her wages and force her to forego her vacation. This
decision involves secondary priority setting, because she makes the decision about resource allocation
that forces the change in tasks.
Suppose, however, that Sue decides not to buy the car, because the raised price makes it
impossible for her to go on vacation and buy the car.163 Again, her priorities have not changed in any
obvious way, but her tasks have changed. She valued the vacation more than the car all along. The
price change the regulation induces, however, has made it impossible for her to avoid choosing between
her priorities.

See VARIAN, supra note 159, 161, at 105 (ordinarily price
increases reduce demand).
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Clearly regulation reduces her economic welfare.164 But characterizing welfare reduction as a
form of regulatory priority setting seems strained at best.
If we assume that the regulation imposes a very great cost for a very meager benefit, an
economist would characterize the regulation as inefficient.165 This might cause economic theory to
disapprove of the regulation causing our consumer to pay more for her car.166 But this disapproval has
little relationship to Sue’s priorities.
When regulatory reformers use examples that rely upon consumer opportunity cost problems to
illustrate their concern for poor priority setting, they are using priority setting in a non-obvious way that
may mislead their readers.167 The loss of the car really is an opportunity cost problem linked to
allocative efficiency concerns. Whenever we purchase something we lose an opportunity to purchase
something else.168 Economists refer to this loss as an opportunity cost.169 It exists with or without
government priority setting, in the sense of ordering and selection. The cost of regulatory compliance,
164

Two assumptions undergird this statement.
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principle value of pollution reductions, improvement of health
and the environment, involves substantial non-economic benefits.
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OPTIMAL

like any other cost, carries with it an opportunity cost.170 The priority setting regulatory reformers,
however, do not object to the generation of opportunity costs when regulatory benefits exceed costs.
Hence, the real heart of the problem here is allocative efficiency, not opportunity cost.171 The reference
to opportunity cost problems as priority setting problems obscures what is at stake.
2. Producer Allocation
Perhaps our car manufacturer fears that raising the price will cause Sue and others to forego
purchasing the car. The manufacturer may then forego the price rise and eat the cost.172 The
manufacturer will then have to allocate more of its own funds to environmental protection and less to
designing new products, paying workers, enriching CEO’s, or paying dividends to shareholders.
Again, this forces a reallocation of resources. While one can construct an argument for characterizing
this as priority setting, it really seems like the involuntary imposition of a cost, with a secondary
allocative impact. The theory of allocative efficiency captures this precisely, describing this as priority
setting captures this in a strained way or not at all.
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See BAXTER, supra note 168, at 10-12

171

See id. at 11-12 (defining optimal pollution).
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Producers cannot pass production price increases on to
consumers for highly price elastic goods because charging more
will simply cause consumers to substitute other products. See
Driesen, supra note 8, at 568 n. 100.
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3. Private Allocation’s Secondary Effects
Thinking about this forced reallocation problem concretely clarifies related regulatory reform
arguments. It becomes clear that the consequences regulatory reformers link to prioritizing defects have
a more problematic and attenuated relationship to stringency than regulatory reformers suggest.
For example, regulatory reformers link poor government priority setting, defined mostly by
reference to overly stringent regulation, with a failure to seize opportunities for cost-effective life saving
measures, such as a more vigorous program of child vaccination.173 Regulatory reformers do not
explain how relaxing even ridiculously stringent government regulation would increase the funding of
childhood vaccination programs, or any of their other preferred public health programs.174
Our car company, if freed from the expensive regulation hypothesized, would realize greater
profits or invest more in its own business in some fashion.175 This would not directly increase child
vaccination. If the car company’s reduced regulatory cost lowered the price of the car, she might buy
the car and go on her vacation. It’s a bit of a stretch to assume that she would contribute to funding
childhood vaccinations. Professor Donohue claims that regulatory expenditures may “curtail private

See e.g. Breyer, supra note 1, at 19, 67 (suggesting a
need for increased spending on childhood vaccinations, prenatal
care, and mammograms).
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See e.g. id. at 67. Cf. McGarity, supra note 1, at 34
(if cost-benefit decisions would eliminate waste, “no vehicle
exists to channel the savings to . . . deserving social
programs”)
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See McGarity, supra note 1, at 35 (regulated companies
will devote the savings realized because of CBA to “things that
make their shareholders happy.”)
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wealth-creating investments and personal expenditures on health promotion and lifesaving.”176 But
relaxing regulatory requirements greatly increases the chance that the money that would have been
spent on compliance will never be spent to save lives, but will instead be used to enhance wealth.177
The conceptual problem at the root of this involves conflating private and public resources.178
The concern about childhood vaccination might support an argument to divert public funds from EPA
(or some EPA programs) to child vaccination programs.179 But childhood vaccinations have relatively
little relationship to decisions about regulatory stringency. Relaxing stringency would free up more
private resources to pursue private ends.
Decisions to regulate weakly would not necessarily free up any agency resources to fund other
government priorities. The stringency of a regulation has no necessary relationship to the amount of
government money devoted to its promulgation and enforcement.
John J. Donohue, Why we Should Discount the Views of
Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L. J. 1901, 1909 (1999)
(correspondence).
176
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YALE L. J. 1911, 1912 (1999) (correspondence) (pointing out that
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lives).
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See generally Heinzerling, supra note 70, at 469 (calling
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spending on childhood vaccination in mind).
Of course,
advocates of such a proposal should also consider other possible
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One can, however, construct elaborate theories linking regulatory stringency to childhood
vaccinations. Perhaps overly stringent regulation constrains wealth creation and therefore makes tax
levies to support childhood vaccinations more difficult. This, however, seems very strained.
Government spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen markedly over the last decade and a half. 180
This suggests that stringent regulation cannot explain failure to adequately fund childhood vaccinations
and less stringent regulation would not improve vaccination programs. Regulatory reforms never place
regulation into a macroeconomic and political context to see whether the attenuated causation chains
implicit in their arguments is plausible.181
A similar failure to look seriously at which resources get allocated through which decisions
bedevils other regulatory reform arguments. For example, Breyer, Sunstein, and many others discuss
the possibility that increased regulatory costs can lead to death, for example, as workers displaced by
high regulatory costs commit suicide and die of heart attacks.182 The linking of high regulatory cost to

See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 350 (1999)(showing a decline in government spending from
23.1% of GDP in 1985 to 19.7% in 1998). The government projects
greater declines in the future.
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Ninja Turtles); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crises of the Welfare State, 113
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job loss has been enormously influential politically; the 104th Congress’ principle vehicle for CBAbased regulatory reform bore the title, “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995.”183
High regulatory costs, however, can create jobs by forcing companies to hire people to prevent
pollution.184 Regulations impact upon employment depends, not upon the ratios of costs to benefits, but
upon the distribution of costs.185
Environmental regulation has caused a small net increase in jobs.186 Furthermore, as I have
demonstrated elsewhere, a cost-benefit criterion does not separate job destroying from job creating
regulation.187 Overly stringent regulation, as defined by regulatory reformers, may increase jobs by
forcing companies hoping to downsize to hire workers to install pollution control devices.188
While stringency does affect the allocation of private sector monies, describing stringency
decisions as a form of priority setting simply obscures what is at stake. It leads to arguments that
conflate the allocation of private monies with the allocation of government revenues. This, in turn fuels
very misleading arguments for regulatory reform.

history of such claims and showing how dubious they are).
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Driesen, supra note 8, at 573; McGarity, supra note 1,
at 48-49.
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My argument decoupling priority setting from stringency, however, has limits. An analyst can
plausibly think of every decision to spend any money as a “prioritizing” decision. Indeed, it is possible
to think of every single action any actor takes as prioritizing, since in a static world of limited resources
every use of any resource limits some other use of that resource. But defining priority setting in such
broad terms makes discussion of priority setting rather meaningless, since everything becomes priority
setting. Furthermore, this everything is priority setting approach is basically misleading. The world we
live in is not static, as the jobs discussion suggested.189 Furthermore, while every use of a resource may
involve some opportunity cost in related areas, it may leave some other potential uses of resources
completely unaffected. Therefore, understanding which pools of resources are involved is important to
serious thinking about secondary priority setting. The framework developed in this article more
meaningfully illuminates the meaning of priority setting and its implications for reforming legal institutions
than an “everything is priority setting” approach.
B. Variations in Dollars Per Life Saved
The variation in dollars per life saved depicted in the Morrall table may reflect variations in the
stringency of regulatory programs.190 The analysis above suggests that viewing stringency and priority
setting as related is misleading. This implies that linking the Morrall table to poor priority setting may
involve some conceptual confusion.
Since the regulatory reformers offer no rationale linking inconsistent stringency to priority
setting, I will try to construct one. Regulatory reformers seem to view all private sector resources as
189

See generally DRIESEN, supra note ?.

190

See Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 89, at 1883-84.
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fungible assets available for deployment to all conceivable health and safety projects.191 Government
through its stringency determinations allocates this money to various societal problems. Allocating too
much money to trivial problems and not enough to important ones could involve poor priority setting.
I have explained, however, that not all allocation decisions function as priority setting decisions.
Can a set of stringency determinations involve secondary priority setting? Decisions about stringency
do not directly determine the timing of regulation, so this kind of allocative decision has little relationship
to ordering. Stringency determinations can only affect selection in the rarest of cases; if the agency
decides not to limit the activity it is regulating at all (an extreme version of a lax regulation), this may
involve a secondary selection.192 But most decisions about stringency will not function as secondary
selection decisions either. Hence, inconsistent stringency determinations, while they affect allocation, do
not generally affect priority setting in its most commonly understood modes of ordering and selection.
Inconsistent stringency might involve what I have called a performance allocation, a decision to
do some jobs well and others less well. I will let the reader decide whether performance allocations
should be considered priority setting at all. But clearly, it would be helpful to distinguish this from
ordering and selection, the most common forms of priority setting.

See Breyer, supra note 1, at 12-18 (following a
discussion of private sector regulatory expenditures with
statements about the “nation” spending too much “to buy a little
extra safety”); Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at (discussing
misallocation of “resources for risk reduction”).
191
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Interview with Terry Davies, Resources for the Future
(May 15, 2000).
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My attempt to link stringency and priority setting, however, suffers from numerous problems.
Private sector funds do not form a fungible pool of resources that a regulating agency can allocate to
our most pressing regulatory priorities, so the first assumption made in trying to link stringency to
priority setting is suspect. While government may require chemical plants to clean-up their own
pollution, government cannot require the owners of chemical plants to improve automobile safety
through better designed passive restraints, even if this would save more lives than control of toxic
pollution from chemical plants.193
Stringency determinations do not reallocate private compliance resources among regulated
industries. A decision to regulate toxics at a chemical plant weakly allows the company to devote more
money to chemical manufacturing, it does not create more funding for auto safety. Similarly, a decision
to regulate auto safety strictly, does not reduce government opportunities to demand stringent
reductions from chemical plants. Hence, stringency determinations have very little or no secondary
impact on cross-program regulatory priority setting. 194
Finally, the view of this as a form of performance allocation seems odd, because this does not
involve one actor performing some tasks well and others less well. Rather, this involves the government

Cf. Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 257-58
(contrasting low cost per life saved through transportation
safety measures with the relatively high cost per life saved for
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demanding a lot from some companies, while demanding less from others. It seems that characterizing
inconsistent stringency as “priority setting” simply adds confusion, even if one accepts the concept of
performance allocation as a kind of priority setting.
Even if thinking of stringency determinations as a form of priority setting somehow aids analysis,
it is not clear why variations in lives saved shows poor priority setting. Regulatory reformers think that
dollars per lives saved should be somewhat even across regulatory programs.195 They do not explain
why this should be so.
One would not expect regulatory programs to produce even approximately even dollars per
lives saved costs. Our regulatory system, like the common law preceding it, is based on the assumption
that people must take some responsibility for the harms they cause.196 Some harms cost more to
remedy than others.197
Furthermore, the regulatory system, again like the common law system, sometimes takes equity
into account in deciding how strict a compliance regime to impose on companies.198 Some companies
See Breyer, supra note 1, at 21-22 (citing variations in
dollars spent per lives saved as evidence a problem of
inconsistency);
195
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(suggesting that technology-based regulation tends to avoid
economic dislocation). See e.g. H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at 328,
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can pay out large sums of money to take care of health and safety problems. Others would go
bankrupt if subjected to strict regulation. Agencies often take this into account in writing regulation,
with resulting unevenness in compliance cost.199 This helps avoid the kind of drastic consequences that
could occur in theory under any regime imposing any cost. While one can criticize stringency
adjustments based on equitable considerations, these adjustments hardly seem irrational.
One can, however, rationalize the expectation that dollars per lives saved should be at least
somewhat even in a stunningly straightforward way. If we assume that costs should be proportionate to
lives saved, then the departure from this norm is troubling.200 But assuming that cost-benefit
considerations should generally control the stringency of regulation involves assuming what regulatory
reformers seek to prove.201
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See Nicholas A. Ashford, An Innovation-Based Strategy for
the Environment, in WORST THINGS FIRST, supra note 66, at 279
(differences in cost per life saved are not irrational unless
rationality is defined “tautologically” as minimizing cost per
fatality).
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C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Priority setting talk suggests that CBA improves government ordering and agenda selection.202
Congressional regulatory reform legislation and regulatory reformers’ proposals, however, involve using
CBA in rulemaking not directed at either function. Rather, they contemplate CBA’s use in establishing
each regulations’ stringency.203 This kind of rulemaking has little to do with primary government priority
setting.
1. CBA to Improve Primary Priority Setting
CBA could perform a role in primary ordering and selection activities. Congress could
consider CBA in establishing rulemaking deadlines and EPA could consider CBA in establishing
schedules and priorities, such as the national priorities list under superfund and the schedule for air
toxics regulation under the Clean Air Act.
Most regulatory reformers say nothing about what principles should govern ordering or
selection in advance of stringency determinations, probably because confusion about the meaning of

See e.g. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 3-4
(defending executive orders requiring cost-benefit analysis as
promoting important goals “in light of the need for sensible
priority setting”). Cf. id. at 43 (comparative risk assessment
used to ensure better priority setting, while “CBA advocates
explore whether a particular policy is justified).
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See e.g. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 202, Pub.
L. No. 104-4; 109 Stat. 48,(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532)
(requiring CBA of rules imposing cost of $100,000,000 or more
per year); Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 294-95
(supporting a “general background requirement of CBA).
203

56

priority setting obscures this issue.204 This question of principles matters, because analysis should focus
on factors relevant to the principles governing a decision.205 Sunstein and Breyer say little about
whether we should employ a worst things first, simplest to regulate first, more favorable cost-benefit
ratios first ordering principle, or some other principle. Careful students of comparative risk assessment
recognize that priority setting involves normative choices and a rich set of potentially relevant factors.206
Pro-CBA prioritizing regulatory reformers, lacking a clear concept of priority setting, often
confuse worst things first and most favorable cost-benefit-ratios first principles. Mathew D. Adler and
Eric Posner, for example, claim that “CBA helps establish priorities.”207 They state that “one might use

Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1423, 1458 (1996) (favoring cost-benefit principles, but
conflating selecting a regulation, a stringency determination,
with selecting targets of regulation, i.e. selection).
204

205

See Driesen, supra note 8, at 609.

See Hornstein, supra note 134. Cf. M. Granger Gordon,
Quantitative Risk Ranking:
More Promise than the Critics
Suggest, in WORST THINGS FIRST?, supra note 66, at 135 (arguing for
such a cost-benefit based priority ranking but recognizing that
this involves a normative choice and would be difficult to
implement).
EPA’s Unfinished Business Report, which Breyer,
Sunstein, and nearly every other regulatory reformer cites,
recognizes a rich set of factors as potentially relevant to
priority setting. EPA, supra note 65, at 2-3. These factors
include not just costs and benefits, but also the benefits to
society of the activities giving rise to a risk, the feasibility
of effective control, political and legislative support for
action, EPA’s ability to make a better contribution than other
entities, and intangible aspects of risk that people find
important. Id. For that reason, EPA viewed its own report’s
focus on comparative risk as only a first step in figuring out
how to set better priorities.
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See Mathew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165, 175 (1999).
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CBA to rank projects by seriousness.”208 But information about the cost of regulation is irrelevant to
ranking projects by the seriousness of health risks. One can simply compare the health risks. This
involves comparative risk assessment, not CBA. 209 Sunstein seems to recognize this distinction
between comparative risk assessment and CBA, but appears similarly confused when he cites a
provision of a bill requiring CBA in regulations imposing large costs on private companies (i.e.
determining stringency) as evidence of Congressional interest in worst things first principles and
comparative risk assessment.210
Furthermore, evaluating the relative seriousness of an environmental problem (the kind of
analysis suggested by a “worst things first” principle) involves a different analysis than evaluating the
benefits of a proposed regulation. Evaluating the seriousness of an existing problem involves
determining the consequences of existing levels of pollution, i.e. baseline conditions. Evaluating the
benefit of a proposed regulation involves comparing this baseline to conditions after implementation of a
proposed regulation.
Analysts who wish to think seriously about ordering should take into account the relationship
between ordering criteria and selection. Increasing the complexity of ordering or selection decisions
raises an issue about whether priority-setting exercises should consume a major portion of the
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Id.
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See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 45.
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Id. at 45 & n. 156 and accompanying text. The Johnston
Amendment, however, did include a comparative risk element,
albeit an awkward one in language not quoted in Sunstein’s
footnote.
See NAPA, supra note 62, at 56 (setting out this
provision in subsection 2), 60 (criticizing this provision).
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resources to accomplish actual change in the real world.211 A long complex ordering or selection
process involves a secondary allocation of government resources that limits the scope of regulatory
programs. Yet, regulatory reformers say little about CBA’s role in ordering and selection, which
suggests that their concerns lie elsewhere.
2. CBA and the Stringency of Environmental Regulation
Since those reformers who support CBA favor introducing it into individual rulemakings to
determine stringency, support for CBA requires a case for its use in determining the stringency of
regulation, rather than priority setting. I have addressed the question of whether CBA should influence
or determine the stringency of regulation elsewhere and plan to focus the discussion here only on those
elements that the theory of priority setting brings more clearly into focus.212

Dale Hattis & Robert L. Goble, Current Priority-Setting
Methodology: Too Little Rationality or Too Much?, in WORST THINGS
FIRST?, supra note 19, at 123 (opining that the “priority-setting
enterprise” should not “consume a major portion of the resources
available to accomplish real change in the real world.”). See
generally Eagle Picher-Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 917 (EPA
briefs reflect concern that the need to repeatedly defend its
priority ranking under Superfund would take funds away from
cleanup).
Regulatory reformers also do not discuss the fact
that ordering exercises sometimes shape a schedule going out a
decade or more for regulations.
See e.g. 42 U.S.C. §
7412(e)(1). This raises issues about information about control
costs, which is necessary for CBA, becoming outdated. See David
M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct the EPA to Allow Serious
Harms to Public Health to Continue?: Cost-Benefit Tests and
NAAQS under the Clean Air Act, 11 Tulane Envt’l L. J. 217, 227230 (1998)(explaining how this difficulty would make CBA of
national ambient air quality standards impractical). CBA could
transform ordering, a step that directly brings no environmental
improvement, into a long drawn out task.
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See Driesen, supra note 8.
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Requirements for CBA in rulemaking establishing regulatory stringency may have a secondary
effect upon government priority setting, reducing the scope of government public health protection.
CBA will increase the cost to the government of carrying out regulatory programs,213 and therefore
should make adequate funding of other programs protecting public health less likely. A requirement for
CBA forces a government agency to spend more money developing each regulation, because of the
need to spend time and energy comprehensively analyzing regulatory costs and benefits.214 This means
that CBA augments agency costs. Conversely, a very simple but strict statutory mandate might
consume few agency resources, but facilitate strict regulation requiring substantial private investment in
pollution control.215 CBA may make adequate funding for competing government health and safety
See id. at 601-605; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1352
(1985)(citing "problems of limited information and excessive
regulatory complexity"); Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at
300 (calculation of costs and benefits involves imposition of
“large information burdens on government).
213

See e.g. Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld,
75 T EXAS L. REV. 525, 541-549 (1997)(describing the analytical
burdens imposed on EPA through judicial imposition of a costbenefit test); McGarity, supra note 1, at 50 (cost-benefit
analyses for major rules have cost millions of dollars apiece in
consulting
contracts
alone);
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY:
THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY at
5 (1996) (referring to "comprehensive rationality").
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Adler & Posner, supra note 206, at 225 (CBA “more
expensive to implement” than unidimensional procedures). Adler
and Posner, however, “doubt” that the criteria of technological
feasability is cheaper and easier to implement than CBA. Id. at
232 n. 179.
This doubt is ill-founded for the simple reason
that CBA requires consideration of almost all of the factors
relevant to the technological feasability inquiry plus health
and environmental factors that are far more difficult to assess
215
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priorities, such as more childhood vaccinations, less likely. If Congress provides adequate funding to
carry out the analysis properly, less government money is available to pay for childhood vaccinations.
So far, however, Congress has not provided the enormous increase in analytical resources
needed for a cost-benefit state to operate.216 This means that the government will likely have to
contract its regulatory agenda in order to complete rulemaking with increased analytical burdens.
than technological feasability. See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2);
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1986)(describing test
for reasonably available control technology); Natural Resources
Defense Council
v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(en
banc)(describing test for health-based air toxics standard);
Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (test for health based air
quality standards); National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,
416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (remanding to collect additional data
because record had inadequate support with respect to
"achievability" of performance standards).
CBA requires
assessment of costs and averted harm from possible pollution
control measures. In order to assess the cost of achieving a
given level of pollution reduction, an agency must understand
the technological options available for meeting a given
pollution reduction requirement in order to estimate cost.
Furthermore, for the judgment about cost to be non-arbitrary, it
must involve considerations of technologies that actually can be
implemented (a feasability judgment similar to that involved in
technology-based regulation).
CBA supplements this technological cost analysis with a
demanding valuation of “benefits,” requiring evaluation of the
precise health and environmental effects of discrete pollution
levels.
Because of gaps in the information available about
pollutants’ effects this is almost always a very difficult and
uncertain inquiry. In any case, the view that CBA is simpler
than technological feasability conflicts with the views of
almost all experts in the field.
See N ATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BREACH OF FAITH: HOW THE
CONTRACT'S FINE PRINT UNDERMINES AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS
6-7
(1995)(EPA Administrator Carol Browner concluded that EPA
compliance with H.R. 9 would require 980 new employees and more
than $220 million).
216
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This involves a form of secondary selective priority setting by Congress; its decision to devote more
resources to analysis requires selection of fewer items for regulation.
Sunstein relies heavily upon priority setting talk to justify CBA, as I have already shown. Our
existing regulatory system, not being based on allocative efficiency and cost-benefit analysis, produces
uneven dollars per lives saved numbers. By labeling departures from allocative efficiency a prioritizing
defect, he avoids having to defend the notion that the regulatory system should reflect an efficiency
norm in the first instance.217

See Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 1, at 253 (rejecting
desirability of implementing all regulation “by reference to the
principle of economic efficiency based on . . . willingness to
pay.”).
Sunstein and other regulatory reformers use other
devices to avoid confronting efficiency. For example, Sunstein
suggests understanding CBA as a desirable effort to replace
“absolutism” with “balancing.” Id. See also Adler & Posner,
supra note 206 (developing a desire-based theory as an
alternative to a preference -based theory for CBA).
This
understanding, however, is untenable.
The regulatory reform
legislation and Sunstein’s own proposal apply CBA not to the
tiny number of statutory provisions forbidding consideration of
costs, but to the overwhelming majority that already authorize
consideration of cost. See id. at 300 (calling for cost-benefit
balancing in statutes currently based on health or technology);
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 202, Pub. L. No. 104-4;
109 Stat. 48,(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532); 42 U.S.C. §
7412(d)(2); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir.
1986)(reasonably available control technology requirement
includes cost consideration); American Textile Manufacturers
Institute Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981)(CBA
irrelevant to feasability determination, but costs are taken
into account); NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(en
banc)(interpreting Clean Air Act's requirement that regulations
addressing hazardous air emissions provide an "ample margin of
safety to allow consideration of cost in creating the ample
margin). Cf. Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980)(cost not taken
into account in setting national ambient air quality standards
217
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Cass Sunstein increasingly emphasizes CBA’s value as a corrective to public misperception of
risk.218 He does not show that public misperception of risk explains the discrepancies in dollars per
lives saved that disturb him or any other set of claimed regulatory defects. Hence, there is a mismatch
between Sunstein’s reasons for reform and the remedy he proposes.219
A variant on Sunstein’s argument about public misperception of risk stripped of its reference to
priority setting might form the basis for a coherent argument for CBA. An argument that regulation is
usually too stringent and the regulatory system too vast because of public misperceptions of risk would
indeed support CBA in at least some rulemaking.220 Since CBA would serve the purpose of reducing
the scope and stringency of rulemaking, it would help correct such a problem.221 An argument that we
(NAAQS)); American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3rd 1027, 10441045 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified, 195 F.3rd 4 (2000), cert.
granted, 68 USLW 3496; 68 USLW 3566 (characterizing EPA’s claim
that its ambient standard did not directly regulate small
business, because states determine the emission limitations on
sources as “incontestable”); Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246,
266 (1976)(states may consider cost in achieving the NAAQS).
See e.g. Timur Kuran & Cass R Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 S TANFORD L. REV. 683 (1999);
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 1.
218

See generally Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory
Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform,
92 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979).
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Cf. Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 1, at 22 (disparities
in dollars per life saved “do not establish pervasive
overregulation, but they do support the view that resources are
misallocated”).
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See McGarity, supra note 1, at 77-78 (CBA will help
industries avoid, slowdown, or reduce the stringency of
regulation); James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits
221
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need to reduce the scope and stringency of the regulatory system would prove difficult to adequately to
support factually. Conceptually, it should rest on a firm demonstration that public hysteria has had a
pervasive pernicious effect upon agency rulemaking and that the countervailing problems of industry
hysteria about cost and tendency to aggressively downplay risk is not a more serious impediment to
sensible regulation.222 It should also address the possibility that less cumbersome remedies might more
effectively address concerns about excessive stringency, such as provisions authorizing delisting of
harmless pollutants and the consideration of certain unintended consequences.223 Furthermore, a
theory that agency rulemaking should correct rather than reflect public risk perceptions would have to
meet constitutional objections based on the placement of legislative authority in democratically elected
legislatures.224 A debate about stringency, however, would address the questions germane to decisions

and Costs of Regulatory Reform for Superfund, 16 STAN ENVTL. L. J.
159, 177 (1997)(CBA would reduce the number of superfund sites
remediated).
Cf. Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 89, at 1883 (pesticide
residues in food are too high despite plenty of public outcry
against pesticides); Heinzerling, supra note 70, at 464
(Breyer’s failure to discuss industry fights to discourage
regulation makes his analysis “woefully incomplete.”); Clayton
Gillette and James Krier, Risk Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PENN.
L REV. 1027, 1061-99 (1990)(explaining why agencies may
underestimate risk).
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See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(authorizing deletion of
substances
from
list
of
regulated
hazardous
air
pollutants),(d)(2)(authorizing consideration of non-air quality
health and environmental impacts while writing air regulations),
223

See Habicht, supra note 131, at 38 (EPA believes that
people have the right to choose which risks society should care
amount the most through democratic institutions).
224
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about increased reliance upon CBA. The discussion of priority setting has diverted attention from those
questions.
Conclusion
We do not know whether we have a serious priority setting problem, because of conceptual
confusion and a failure to consider the information most germane to evaluating that issue. If we do have
a priority setting problem, CBA in rulemaking that develops regulatory standards (as opposed to
regulatory schedules) will not address the problem.

65

